

SPEECH

by

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CIA AND WORLD AFFAIRS

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Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am delighted to be here and to have an opportunity to talk to you a little bit about something which most of my 35 years in Government have been specifically addressed to and that is, namely, the question of intelligence.

I think that one of the great questions that people ask all the time is: What is this intelligence about which people talk so much; what is it and what does it mean to the United States. Well, intelligence is information on actions, capabilities, intentions-- political, military, economic and financial--of foreign countries that may have some impact on our lives. It may affect our living in some way. We have always set up a good intelligence service during our wars and we have almost always systematically destroyed it as soon as the war was over. This time we waited a little longer because we had the Korean War and the Vietnamese War.

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In 1942 I was sent to the U.S. Army's Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland. You know who the Commandant was? A British colonel! That was the state of American intelligence in August 1942.

Now the last great investigation we had was in 1946 to ascertain what had happened at Pearl Harbor. And this uncovered the fact that various people in various parts of the U.S. Government had information which, had it all been brought together in one place, might have enabled us not to avoid Pearl Harbor but at least to minimize its effects. And so it was decided in 1947 by the Congress to create a central place, the Central Intelligence Agency, which would be the central repository or the place where all this intelligence would come in and be evaluated and passed on to the policymakers in the United States. We were created by the National Security Act of 1947 which set up the Defense Department; that is one of the reasons why our primary oversight committees in the Congress are the Armed Services Committees.

Now, we were created obviously for the purpose of engaging in espionage. But you know that we Americans have a certain pharisaical streak in our national character

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which says, "All of this is all right for the dirty old British, French, Russians and Germans, but we pure Americans don't do things like that." So what the law said was that the CIA would do "such other things as the National Security Council might direct." Throughout our past in the United States we have had this thing about ourselves that really the Founding Fathers wouldn't have liked all this stuff and would have wanted to let it all hang out, but this is just not historically correct.

George Washington, for instance, organized three separate kidnapping attempts on Benedict Arnold. And I think we all know what he was going to do with him when he got him. George Washington was one of the great users of intelligence in American history, and he had a very tough situation. He had a very small Army, facing a great world power and a very, very tough situation indeed. Now he wrote a letter to his chief of intelligence in New Jersey, a Colonel Elias Dayton, and this is what he said literally: "The need for procuring good intelligence is so obvious that I have nothing further to add on this subject. All that remains for me is to tell you that these matters must be kept entirely secret. For lack of such secrecy these

enterprises, no matter how promising the outlook, generally fail. I am sir, your obedient servant, G. Washington."

Now, one more little story about Washington. He spent the night in Connecticut at the home of a sympathizer, a Mr. Holcomb. In the morning when he was leaving, he got up on his horse and Mrs. Holcomb came out to say goodbye to him. She said, "And pray, General, where do you ride tonight?" He leaned down in the saddle and said, Madame, can you keep a secret?" And she said, "Of course." He said, "So can I, Madame." He tipped his hat and rode off.

So all this business that the Founding Fathers wanted us to tell everybody everything is just not historically accurate.

Mr. Truman, in 1956, said, "It matters not to the United States whether its secrets become known through the action of spies or through publication. The damage to the United States in both cases is the same. And I for one do not believe," said Mr. Truman, "that the best interests of our country are served by going on the principle that everybody is entitled to know everything about us." One hundred eighty or ninety years separated the two men, both of whom bore the same kind of responsibility, and both of them understood that a great modern state to survive must be well informed.

Now, how does the CIA operate? The CIA operates, according to its charter, as a branch of the Executive, responsible to a number of oversight committees in Congress, including the Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations Committees. You hear all about our secret budget. Yes, our budget is not published. But we go through exactly the same procedures with the Office of Management and Budget and with the Appropriations Committees as every other agency in the Government. From these oversight committees we have no secrets. We'll tell them anything they want to know--the details of our operations, and so forth.

The Government Operations Committee has an oversight role over us. For our so-called political activities and operations abroad, the Foreign Relations Committees have oversight over us. So, we report to about six or eight committees in the Congress, which is a fairly considerable percentage of the Congress.

Now, this oversight has varied. In the past, the Congress didn't want to know about these things or no more than the bare outlines. Now they want to know in great detail.

We accommodate ourselves to either one. All we ask is that there be responsibility and a certain amount of discretion since the lives of people may be at stake. Now, one of the things that I think there is the greatest confusion about is the idea that the CIA is some sort of a mysterious organization which operates and has policies of its own--like the CIA is doing this in Angola, or the CIA is doing that in Vietnam, or the CIA is doing something somewhere else. The CIA is a responsible agency of the United States Government and does what the United States Government tells it to do.

When I go down to the White House to a meeting and there is a discussion of policy, it generally starts with the Director, Mr. Bush, or myself, presenting the intelligence picture and saying if you do option one, this probably will happen; if you do option two, this will happen; if you do option three, that will happen. When the discussion starts as to what the United States should do as between State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, or whoever else is responsible, we don't speak.

At one of my first meetings when I was down there, Mr. Kissinger went around the table asking each person what do you think we should do, and they said no, yes, no, yes, and

he pointed at me and I said, "No." He said, "You don't have any vote," and went on to the next one. We are an information-gathering agency. We present that information, analyzed with our best judgment, to the responsible parties in the United States Government who have to make the decisions.

Now, one other thing I want to clear up is an idea that CIA sort of sits with its little package of secrets, Defense sits with its package of secrets, and State with its, and FBI with its. Not any more. This may have happened many years ago. We all work on the same data base. Once a week the top people of all these organizations meet and we decide on the estimates that are going to be presented to the United States Government. If we don't agree, there is a footnote at the bottom of the estimate that says the Air Force doesn't agree with this, or Defense Intelligence doesn't agree with that. In this way, the policymakers know what dissent there is and what grounds it is based on--that it isn't just that the dissenters are opposed to it, for there has got to be some explanation of why they are opposed to it.

Now how do we collect this intelligence? We collect this intelligence in a number of ways. To look at the movies and to listen to some of the disclosures, you'd think that espionage is the only way we do this. Well, that's nonsense. There is an awful lot of intelligence that is available from overt sources. We have old ladies who have been



reading the Minsk Pravda for 25 years. And if you read the Minsk Pravda for 25 years, you can tell not only what is going on in the White Russian Party, but what's going on in the Soviet Union. Often in these provincial newspapers, you'll get a foreshadow of what is coming afterwards. So the first way we do it, is overtly: by reading the newspapers and reading the State Department's Embassy reports, by listening to radio broadcasts and learning what these countries are telling their own people internally or what they are telling people abroad in foreign language broadcasts. I would say this amounts to about fifty percent of all the intelligence we collect. But it is obviously the easiest fifty percent to collect. Then we collect with what has been one of the United States great contributions to intelligence: with modern technology, with various technical means that we have above our heads and below our feet, and so forth. This has been one of the great places where American genius has been applied.

We face the problems that we have with these great closed societies. In the United States, a foreign country could buy an American magazine that will give them information about a U.S. missile silo that would cost hundreds of millions of dollars to get about the Soviet Union or China.

Mr. Colby, our former director, once said that the difference between him and Mr. Andropov, who is the head of the Soviet intelligence service, is that he has to pick out the crumbs and make sense from them. Mr. Andropov is so snowed under with information that he has to try and pick out what he thinks is real and what isn't real. And, of course, with the kind of mentality the Soviets have, I am sure they are trying to puzzle out what the United States is really doing in intelligence now. Because, obviously, we wouldn't expose our own intelligence system like this unless we had another one which was really working out in the shadows. So I think they are probably cracking their heads right now to find out what is real and what is false. Frankly I do not feel we ought to do anything to clarify that difficulty for them.

Now the main reason why intelligence is more important today in this country than at any time since Valley Forge is that it is our only chance of preventing a surprise. At Pearl Harbor we were surprised. But it was a time when we had months and miles of distance to recover and get ready. We recovered from the naval Pearl Harbor. I wonder if we could recover from a nuclear Pearl Harbor.

It is vitally essential that our people know ahead of time what may happen and what precautions we must take against these things. Now, the mere fact that the United States has an effective intelligence service inhibits those who might be tempted to move against us. The most important thing is that the Soviets know that we know. In 1960 you had a great debate in this country about whether there was a missile gap. Well you couldn't have that today because our knowledge is sufficiently good that we know what they have. This technology is the second way we collect.

The third way we collect, and this is the one that attracts the most interest and the most excitement and titillates people the most, is covert or human intelligence. You had situations such as the Middle East War where we knew what forces were present there. What we were not privy to was the decision to go at two o'clock in the afternoon of the sixth of October. There is only one way you can get that and that is inside somebody's head; or there is only one thing that can tell you that, and that is someone who is privy to that knowledge.

But this type of thing represents, together with the covert action that you have heard of, a very small part of our efforts. Maybe five or six percent of our efforts. But

it is the hardest intelligence to get and when you are successful it is extremely rewarding in enabling you to know what is going on.

Covert action is also a function: that is, to take action to help those people the United States Government believes to be its friends or believes it advantageous for the United States to assist. Again, you will get a lot of people who will say we shouldn't be doing this, it's immoral or it hasn't been done in America or anything else. Well, I would just ask some Americans to contemplate how they think we got Texas or California. I would talk gently about covert action in this Bicentennial Year. If there hadn't been the most massive French covert action against Great Britain, we just might not be celebrating a bicentennial. The French had 17,000 troops ashore in North America before France went to war with Great Britain. You'd be surprised at some of the things that went on.

A man by the name of Beaumarchais, who wrote "The Barber of Seville" and "The Marriage of Figaro," organized the first intelligence proprietary in history--a company called Hortalez--the purpose of which was to buy arms in France and Spain for the American revolutionaries.

Basically, this type of action gives the United States something between a diplomatic protest and landing U.S. armed forces. If we want it to, it provides us with the means of quietly assisting people we believe to be friendly to the United States and whose destruction would increase the danger to the American people. It gives us an ability to quietly aid friends who are seeking to protect themselves against Communist subversion or even against open aggression. As a matter of fact, recent events have made clear to us that unlike the past where we faced basically continental powers like Germany, today we have global powers. Germany, at the height of its power, even when it occupied most of Europe, did not have any real capacity to damage the United States continentally. The Germans could sink some ships off the coast and so forth, but they had no real capability against the heartland of America.

The Soviet Union is today a global power. The Soviet Union has today the power to inflict damage on the United States, which no country has had since Valley Forge. And recent events in Angola have demonstrated that the Soviet Union is not only able but willing to project its power 10,000 miles from the Soviet Union. We must take that message and understand what we have been told. Mr.

Brezhnev has told us that detente is great, but it in no way inhibits the support of the Soviet Union for wars of national liberation.

Many people said we should have read Hitler's Mein Kampf before; but Mr. Brezhnev is sending us a message and the Soviets are sending us a message that we've got to understand: that they are prepared to support these wars of national liberation with or without detente. As a matter of fact, I was looking through a book of Russian proverbs--the Russians are great on proverbs; they always hit somebody with a proverb--and I found a beautiful proverb. It said in Russian, "When you make friends with a bear, hold on to your axe." And they have some pretty good ones. They have one like Mr. Truman's which said, "If you can't stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen." The Russians have a very good one on that. They say, "If you fear wolves, don't go into the forest; but if you don't go into the forest, you're not going to have any mushrooms."

We have to bear this, but one of the problems is that in the year when we are investigating and castigating our intelligence services, the Soviet Union is putting out a special stamp to honor the fiftieth anniversary of the KGB.

The head of a friendly foreign service said to me the other day, "You know, I don't understand why all you Americans are not Catholics," and I said, "What does that have to do with it?" And he said, "Think. It's the only religion that offers confession for everybody." Then he paused and said, "But I suppose it's the fact that it's private that is the real drawback."

But the problem we have is that these people know, and they know us well, the importance we attach to fair play, to the rights and liberties of our citizens. And they use the fact that they do not have similar constraints or moral restraints in their efforts to alter or control our society.

Yes, I can't tell you that in the 27 years the CIA has existed that we haven't had some people who have shown bad judgment, some kooks, some zealots, some people who have gone off and done things that they probably shouldn't have done. But 76,000 people have passed through the Central Intelligence in this time. Now you take any community in the United States of 76,000 people and subject it to the kind of scrutiny we've been subjected to over the last year and a half, and I submit that our record will not look all that bad. I may be wrong, but as of today, in spite of all the accusations, I know

of no one in the CIA who has been indicted or convicted of any particular crime involved in the operation of intelligence. If you read the newspapers, you hear all about the assassination theory, but the fact is, what was the final finding: that nobody was assassinated. You read all about the toxins, well what was the final finding: the toxins were never used.

Somebody wondered once how we got into these things. Well, the Soviets in the Fifties killed several people in West Germany by using these toxins. We were afraid that they would be used against us so we looked into them to see what measures could be taken to protect ourselves against them and we developed them and we put them away in an icebox and left them there for 25 years. But this knowledge which we reported to the Congress--nobody found us out--was presented as some frightful crime that we had committed. The drug tests: one man, as you know, on whom this drug was tried, committed suicide which was very regrettable and obviously a clear case of very bad judgment. But why did we do this? We saw a man like Cardinal Mindzenty, who had resisted every pressure and torture of the Nazis, suddenly come before the movie cameras, hollow-eyed, to confess to everything his Commununist masters wanted. Those of you who are



old enough to remember believed--we all believed--it was done with mind-bending drugs. These drugs might be used on us. We had to find out about them, and it wasn't just the CIA and the armed services who were engaged in this kind of research: many prominent institutions in the United States, including the National Institutes of Health were engaged in similar research.

To give you a parallel, the United States, between the wars, undertook that it would not use poison gas. This did not prevent the United States from manufacturing several million poison gas shells to have ready in case they were used against us.

So all I am saying is, yes, there have been wrongdoings, there has been some illegal activity and so forth, but it has been distorted out of all proportion and magnified out of all proportion. One of the things, for instance, that we were accused of doing was illegal telephone taps. Yes, there were illegal telephone taps. There were 32 of them in 27 years. That's an average of one and a third illegal telephone taps per year. But the Director of Central Intelligence is the only person in the United States Government who is charged by law with the protection of his sources and methods. And it is against this background and the background, for instance, of the Doolittle Commission which

investigated the CIA in the Fifties and whose findings were that the United States faced a ruthless enemy, bent on destroying us by every means at its command and that we would have to match the enemy's dedication with ours and its ruthlessness with ours.

This business of judging history retrospectively-- the signers of the Declaration of Independence had slaves. Today the idea of not having universal suffrage would outrage us, but it was many years after the Revolution before all Americans were able to vote. You had to have a certain amount of money and pay a certain amount of taxes. You cannot look at yesterday through the eyes of today.

So whatever guidelines we get from the Congress, we hope they will contain the mechanism for change, as the perception of the American people of what is right and wrong and of what they want done changes. Yes, I am concerned that our time has been pilloried for our alleged sins of commission; what I worry about is that 20 years from now our successors will be pilloried for their sins of omission: you mean you didn't do this; you mean you weren't keeping track of that; you mean you weren't doing this? So this is one of the things we've got to face. But I hope we get whatever final guidelines we need.

You've heard reports about some of our intelligence failures. President Kennedy once said to us that we were condemned in our business to be pilloried for our failures and to have our successes passed over in silence. The so-called failures of which you've heard are studies that we ourselves did, in which we found that we had failed to predict this, that, or the other. And we passed those to the Congress. Unfortunately, we do not do post-mortems of successes, and successes we have had. We correctly predicted almost every single strategic weapon developed by the Soviets and approximately the time and so forth. These are not spectacular. But we really predicted these things.

Now, in my opinion, if you can predict there will be a coup or something or other in some place, that's great. But really our purpose is not this sort of gold-ring business. Our purpose is to increase the understanding and broaden the comprehension of American policy-makers of the various problems which they have to face and about which they have to make decisions. And if we can get something like this, of course that's great.

But today intelligence is knowledge and knowledge is power and good intelligence provides a firm basis for the foreign policy of the United States.

Now what does this cost the American people? Less than one penny out of every dollar spent by the Federal Government goes for intelligence. In the last six years the personnel of the United States Government working on intelligence has declined 40 percent. And yet in this time the ability of potential enemies to strike and harm the United States has grown. We have had a whole new factor appear on the scene which is economic intelligence. In the old days economic intelligence was a sort of by-product of a military capability study. Today economic intelligence is an immensely important thing for itself. We have billions of petrodollars, billions of Eurodollars moving around the world and being used in ways that can affect the livelihood of American workers in Miami or in Omaha. We have an impact of these things on our internal economic situation which we have never seen before. It is our knowledge of what the Soviets and the Chinese have that enables us to keep the U.S. defense budget within reasonable limits. If we did not know pretty accurately what the Soviet and Chinese strategic forces were, what would it cost the American people to protect themselves against an unknown quantity on the other side, we would have to prepare for an open-ended threat. The cost would be appalling to the American people.

We work with friendly services that have been helpful to us. What impact has all of this had on our role in world affairs? Well, it has damaged us some. But it has damaged us less than I thought it would, considering that we are the only nation in the history of the world ever to go through this sort of a convulsion. One of the things we will never be able to measure, however, is who would have come to us with intelligence and did not because of the fear of exposure. What Soviet was waiting like Penkovsky with immense amounts of information, but at the last minute thought, "No, if I do that my name will come out in some investigation or it will be published in some newspaper. I can't take the risk." We've been hurt some, but not as much as I thought we would, and that is fortunate, because we live in a time when this is very important to us.

This passion of ours for exposure and publicity is a fascinating thing to other people. It reminds me of a story I once heard that the Soviets had recruited a Neapolitan, took him to the Soviet Union, trained him in secret radio, secret writing, and everything else. Then they said, "Now you go back to Naples and stay there and in couple of years we will be in touch with you and have a mission for you." This man's name was Agnello. So, about

three years later Agnello's Soviet agent went to the address in Naples and he looked at the door and he saw, "Agnello, ground floor right." So he pushed the button, went in, and he said, "Signor Agnello?" The man said, "Yes." He said, "I am from Moscow." The guy looked at him and said, "I am Agnello the tailor; Agnello the spy is on the third floor." You know, we're pretty much like Agnello ourselves.

But the fundamental thing for the United States is that the great cushion of time and space that we've always had in the past is gone. When George Washington told us that eternal vigilance was the price of freedom, he was talking about a country that had two or three months to prepare and an ocean on either side. We don't have that any more. We not only have a military threat, we have an economic threat; if we don't know what people are doing, we are going to be at a enormous disadvantage in the world.

One of the things we've got to do is to provide answers to the American Government and people on what I think are the four most vital questions of our time: who will be in control of the Soviet Union five years from today; what will be their dispositions towards us and towards our allies; what is there in Soviet research and development today that will impact on our American way of life in the years ahead? We have the same questions for China. We

owe the the American people answers on those and we will try to give the American people answers on those. They are really vital questions, not only to our advantage but to our very survival as a free nation. It is an enormous responsibility.

I am not an old CIA man; I came to the CIA for the first time just about four years ago. People often ask me what my impression is after this period of time and I say, if I could sum up my impression in one word, I would sum it up in the word "reassurance." I am reassured at the competence; I am reassured at the continuity; I am reassured at the ability to work with our colleagues in Defense and the other branches of the Government to provide the United States Government with what I believe to be the best intelligence in the world. Most of all I am reassured by the people I find there who are Americans like other Americans, who live by the same standards of right and wrong, who understand that secrecy cannot be used to cover abuses, who understand that we cannot operate an intelligence agency unless we operate it within limits acceptable to the American people. And so, I sum up my impressions after these years by saying I am reassured by what I find there.

The problem is that we must keep our Government informed of political, economic, military, financial, and monetary facts all over the world.

I might add that one thing for which we got no credit was that six months ago we predicted almost exactly the degree of the Soviet crop failure, almost exactly what the Soviets themselves announced, with all the immense consequences that is going to have not only in this year but in the next year. They are slaughtering cattle now, there will be a meat shortage next year. This is just one illustration of the sort of thing that is immensely important to us. And the fact that people today have enormous quantities of our currency that they can use around the world in various ways that can affect our livelihood.

We bear a very heavy responsibility. A responsibility not just for the survival of our nation, but the responsibility for the assisting in the survival of human freedom. If we fall there is no one else ready to pick up the torch. We watch the world. We watch the tension between the Soviets and the Chinese.

I must tell you one other amusing story on that. Allegedly when Mr. Nixon was in Moscow, he was talking with Secretary Brezhnev and Brezhnev said to him, "You know, I had a strange dream the other day." Mr. Nixon said, "What was that?" and he said, "Well, I dreamt I was in Washington, I looked down Pennsylvania Avenue and



I saw this great flag flying over the Capitol." And Mr. Nixon said, "Yes, it is the American flag, it flies there whenever the Congress is in session." Brezhnev said, "No, it was not the American flag, it had something written on it." Mr. Nixon said, "Written? What did it have written on it?" Brezhnev said, "It had written on it, 'Capitalism is doomed.'" Mr. Nixon said, "That's very interesting. I had almost the same dream." Brezhnev said, "What did you dream?" And he said, "Well I dreamt I was in Red Square, I was looking at the Kremlin and on the highest tower of the Kremlin there was a great flag flying." Mr. Brezhnev said, "Soviet flag; always flies there," and Mr. Nixon said, "No, it had something written on it." Mr. Brezhnev said, "Written? What did it have written on it?" Mr. Nixon replied, "I wish I could tell you, but I can't read Chinese."

So, we have to watch all of these problems. In the old days, these things could impact. James Madison once said that he hadn't heard from his Minister in Spain in two years, and if he didn't hear from him within the next twelve months, he was going to send someone to find out what was going on in Spain. Well that no longer happens. Something happens in Afghanistan and the U.S. Government has got to take a stand on it within hours. Or in any other part of

the world, in Rwanda or in New Zealand, and the only way we can do this is by having a maximum amount of knowledge concerning this.

We are not perfect. As I told you, we've had kooks, we've had zealots, we've had people who have done things we'd rather they did not do. But I think if you take the whole long balance of what we've done and what we have supplied, with our colleagues in the other parts of intelligence in the U. S. Government, to the American people, the fact is that our successes you never hear about.

For instance, what President of the United States could sign any kind of an arms limitation agreement if he did not have the ability to verify compliance from the other side? Many times we've gotten no credit for this. One country has thought another country was about to attack it. We've had the intelligence to go to both sides and say that they are not going to attack, and the war has not taken place. But we accept this, that you don't get credit. We did go into the forest and we may or may not get mushrooms, but we did not fear the wolves.

As I have said, the responsibility we bear to the American people is very heavy. All of us are very conscious of it. We know that we cannot really fail in the big sense and allow the United States to be surprised.

My generation was told by Churchill that we would have as our only companions on our journey, "blood, sweat, tears and toil." I think this generation of people working in intelligence needs three companions on their journey. They need faith to light the road ahead, for dark is the road of the man who walks without faith. They need enthusiasm which moves the young and keeps the older productive. Most of all, they need courage, which is the greatest of human virtues because it is the guarantee of all the others. I have found all of these qualities in the American intelligence community, and particularly in CIA. I have served 35 years in the Army and I am as proud of my association with the Central Intelligence Agency as I am of my association with the United States Armed Forces. We understand our responsibility to the American people and to human freedom. We will do our best not to let you down.

Thank you very much.